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INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY AND NATURALIZED PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE HARVEY SIEGELtt
University of Miami
In two recent papers, I criticized Ronald N. Giere's and Larry Laudan's arguments for 'naturalizing' the philosophy of science (Siegel 1989 (Siegel , 1990 . Both Giere and Laudan replied to my criticisms (Giere 1989 , Laudan 1990b . The key issue arising in both interchanges is these naturalists' embrace of instrumental conceptions of rationality, and their concomitant rejection of non-instrumental conceptions of that key normative notion. In this reply I argue that their accounts of science's rationality as exclusively instrumental fail, and consequently that their cases for 'normatively naturalizing' the philosophy of science fail as well.
Ronald N. Giere (1984 Giere ( , 1985 Giere ( , 1987 Giere ( , 1988 Giere ( , 1989 and Larry Laudan (1984 Laudan ( , 1987a Laudan ( , 1987b Laudan ( , 1988 Laudan ( , 1990a Laudan ( , 1990b both defend the 'naturalizing' of the philosophy of science. They argue that important philosophical questions concerning scienceincluding questions concerning the normative evaluations of competing scientific theories, and the rationality of decisions to accept/reject such theories-are properly settled on empirical grounds. Giere and Laudan both accept the legitimacy of normative rationality1, but insist that rationality be understood instrumentally, in means-ends fashion. According to this sort of naturalism, we can scientifically investigate the instrumental value that beliefs, cognitive processes and scientific methodologies have in achieving our ends; insofar as they have instrumental value, we can say that such beliefs and methodologies are rational. On this view rationality is instrumental, naturalistic and fully normative.
I will argue in what follows that the success of the case for naturalizing the philosophy of science in a way that maintains its normativity2 turns on the adequacy of the naturalist's treatment of rationality. I will criticize those versions of normative naturalism, like Giere's and Laudan's, which are committed to a wholly instrumentalist conception of rationality. In particular, I will challenge their claim tThis paper draws upon an invited address presented at the Eastern Divison APA meeting in Washington, D.C. on December 29, 1992. I am grateful to Robert Almeder for his insightful commentary on that occasion, to Hal Brown, Jaegwon Kim, Ellen Klein, and Matthias Steup, and to members of audiences at the APA session, the University of Florida, and the University of Miami, especially John Biro, Leonard Carrier, Susan Haack, Risto Hilpinen, Alan Goldman, Peter Klein, Kirk Ludwig, and Howard Pospesel, for their incisive criticisms of earlier drafts. Special thanks to Ed Erwin for his excellent analysis and suggestions. 'Interpreting Giere on this point is not straightforward. Giere's earlier papers appear to eschew normative rationality altogether (see Siegel 1989 for textual support), but by his (1988) and (1989) he embraces instrumental rationality. In my (1989) I criticize Giere when interpreted as rejecting normative rationality in his version of naturalized philosophy of science; here I criticize his instrumentally normative version of naturalism.
2In Siegel 1996 I criticize non-normative naturalism. In this paper I am concerned only with normative naturalism of the sort defended by Giere and Laudan. Philosophy of Science, 63 (Proceedings) pp. S116-S 124. 0031-8248/96/63supp-0014$2.00 Copyright 1996 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
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This content downloaded from 129.125.148.19 on Tue, 30 Oct 2018 08:26:34 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms that an instrumental, means-ends rationality is as rich a conception as we should want or can have. I will argue that the instrumental-n uralistic account of rationality is inadequate, and that an adequate go beyond instrumental concerns and be 'categorical'.
1. Giere and Laudan on the Instrumental Character of Science's Rati explicitly distinguishes categorical or unconditional rationality from rationality, and insists that the latter, though not the former, has a in his naturalized philosophy of science (1988, (7) (8) (9) (10) . And in his responding to Siegel (1989) , underlines this insistence:
The central issue, I believe, is this. Siegel, following the dominan believes that it is possible to discover epistemological principles tonomous from science. Such principles would provide an auto rant for normative claims as to how scientists should act. They w criteria for categorical, or unconditional, rationality among scie The naturalist, by contrast, believes that there is no autonomo epistemological principles. This is not to deny that there are bett ways of attempting to do science, or to reject the possibility of g about how best to proceed. But the corresponding principles o are only instrumental, or conditional. They connect research str the goals of research. And establishing these connections itself r entific inquiry. (Giere 1989, 377; emphases in original) If there were autonomous principles of justification, they wou standards of what is often called categorical, or unconditional, r But there is another, weaker, form of rationality which is cond instrumental. To be instrumentally rational is simply to employ me to be conducive to achieving desired goals.... [T] here is also a mor sense of instrumental rationality which consists in employing m not only believed to be, but are in fact conducive to achieving d This latter, objective, sense of instrumental rationality provid ralistic theorist of science with ample means for making norma about science. These claims, however, are not autonomous but ar within science itself. It requires empirical research to determi particular strategy is in fact likely to be effective in producing entific results. (1989, 379-80;, emphases in original) Thus a naturalized philosophy of science ... can provide a basis mative judgments. These judgments would, of course, be only ins and not categorically, normative. But for the naturalist, that is t of normative judgment anyone can legitimately make. There is n rationality. (1989, 382; emphases in original) In these passages Giere makes clear both his rejection of categoric and his acceptance of instrumental rationality. He also makes clear w the latter sort of rationality is at home in a naturalistic setting: ("objective") instrumental rationality "consists in employing means only believed to be, but are in fact conducive to achieving desired whether means are so conducive is an empirical question open to nat vestigation. Determinations of instrumental rationality thus require investigation, and such investigation fully licenses judgments of ins tionality. Thus, for Giere, are naturalism and instrumental rational Laudan, like Giere, explicitly rejects any non-instrumental version his account of rationality is thoroughly instrumentalist: 
org/terms
The conduct of a given inquiry will be rational just insofar as we hav to believe that that inquiry process will be likely to realize our end dan 1988, 349; emphasis in original) ... an empirical approach to epistemology requires attention to those normative linkages between cognitive ends and means which scientific rationality. (Laudan 1984, 41) On Laudan's view, the rationality of science involves simply these in "normative linkages between cognitive ends and means." And in his Siegel (1990) , Laudan emphatically insists that rationality can only be in Siegel tells us that there are two, mutually exclusive forms of ratio justification: instrumental and epistemic. But ... epistemic justificat in Siegel's sense-is simply a species of the genus instrumental rat Epistemic rationality, no less than any other sort of rationality, is a integrating ends and means. (1990b, 318) Good reasons are instrumental reasons; there is no other sort. (19
The view here articulated by Giere and Laudan-that the only legit ception of rationality is instrumental-is very widely held in contempo temology and philosophy of science. Advocates of normative naturali tually unanimous in embracing this sort of instrumentalist account of rationality/normativity.3 Consequently, although in what follows I res to discussion of Laudan and Giere, and to the notion of rationality as i the philosophy of science, the issues here addressed have a much wider mological significance than these self-imposed restrictions might sugg case, I turn now to a critical evaluation of Giere's and Laudan's discussions.
2. Can Rationality in Science Be Instrumental Only? The Basic Argument. I will now argue that instrumental rationality itself depends on a non-instrumental conception of rationality-that is, that instrumental rationality cannot be coherently understood without recourse to a 'categorical' conception of rationality which underlies it. The fundamental difficulty with regarding instrumental rationality as exhaustive of rationality, either in science or in general, is that making sense of it requires appeal to an underlying, non-instrumental conception of rationality; consequently, instrumental, means-ends concerns cannot be the whole story about science's rationality (or epistemic normativity more generally).4
It is clear, as naturalists insist, that judgments of instrumental efficacy require appeal to empirical evidence concerning the efficacy of proposed means with respect to the achievement of given ends. In a case in which such efficacy is established by such evidence, we have good instrumental reason to utilize the means established by that evidence as efficacious for the realization of those ends, in so far as we embrace them as our ends.
But how are we to understand the relationship between the evidence for instrumental efficacy and the means-ends pairs concerning whose efficacy it is evidence? What we have is a situation of the following form: Evidence E suggests that means M is instrumentally efficacious with respect to goal G. It is M's efficacy with respect to G which is established by E. What is the relationship between E and the rest of 3Brown (1988, 65) , Fuller (1988 Fuller ( , 1989 , Gibson (1988,16, 47, 69) , Kitcher (1992, 62-64) , Kornblith (1993) , Maffie (1990a Maffie ( , 1990b , and Quine (1986, 655) are among the many contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of science who join Giere and Laudan in rejecting categorical conceptions and embracing instrumental conceptions of epistemic rationality/normativity. 4The germ of the argument which follows is offered, but only very briefly, in Siegel 1990 .
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This content downloaded from 129. this 'formula'? In order for the judgment or claim C (that M is indeed tally efficacious with respect to G) to be justified, it must be the cas stitutes evidence which warrants, or makes justified, or renders it ration the belief/claim C, i.e. the claim that M is indeed so efficacious. But t claim, concerning the probative or evidential force of E with respect a claim involving instrumental efficacy at all. M may be instrumentall with respect to G; but the relationship between E and that claim co strumental efficacy is not itself one of instrumental efficacy. On the order for our judgments concerning instrumental efficacy to be thems ally justified, they must be related to the evidence for them in a non-i standardly epistemic or probative sense. In this way, claims concer mental efficacy presuppose, and depend for their own justificatio instrumental (and in that sense 'categorical') relation between such cla evidence for them. That relation cannot itself be understood in terms of instrumental efficacy: it is not that regarding the evidence for such a claim as powerful is a matter of seeing that regarding it that way serves to further some other goal that we happen to have. Rather, the evidence must establish it as justified or warranted that the means is indeed instrumentally efficacious with respect to the goal. This relation, between the evidence which justifies the claim and the claim (concerning instrumental efficacy) which it renders justified, is just the traditional (categorical) epistemic relation between a claim or belief and the reasons or evidence which support(s) it. Thus the instrumentalist-only normative naturalist requires a non-instrumental account of evidential support or epistemic warrant; she needs a 'categorical', i.e. non-instrumental, normative theory of evidence to make her instrumental story work.5
The point can be seen more clearly if we attend to a buried equivocation in the case for instrumental rationality considered thus far. The instrumentalist conflates instrumental efficacy and instrumental rationality, and uses these notions interchangeably. This adds undeserved plausibility to her account of rationality. For the former is a causal notion: M is efficacious with respect to G iff (utilization of) M tends to bring about the achievement of G. But why should such causal efficacy be thought to have anything to do with rationality, or with normative notions of epistemic evaluation more generally?
Consider an example. Let M = the utilization of double-blind methodology. Let G = the discovery of the actual medicinal properties of a drug, e.g. its ability to ameliorate some disease. Now, what is the relationship between M and G? Suppose that M is efficacious with respect to G. This is a causal relation: if we utilize double-blind methodology, we are more likely to discover the actual medicinal properties of the drug. How does rationality enter the picture? Once we've established the causal efficacy of double-blind methodology with respect to that goal, we are rational to utilize that methodology given our wish to accomplish that goal. The rationality of our utilization of M is not constituted by the causal relation obtaining between M and G, however. Rather, it is constituted by an epistemic rather than a causal relation-namely, the relation between E (the evidence which suggests that M is in fact causally efficacious with respect to G) and the claim C concerning causal efficacy for which it provides evidential support. That is, what makes the utilization of M rational is the evidence which justifies our judgment that that utilization is efficacious with respect to the achievement of G. The relation between M and G is causal, not epistemic; the relation between E and the efficacy 5Virtually the same point, made in terms of "irreducible epistemology", is made by John Worrall (1990, 318 claim C it supports is epistemic, not causal. When the instrumentali instrumental efficacy and instrumental rationality, she runs toget distinct relationships, which obtain between quite distinct relata (K 1996) . Thus, underlying judgments concerning instrumental efficacy is an epistemic, (non-instrumentally) normative relation between reasons or evidence and the judgments, beliefs, and claims concerning causal efficacy which those reasons or that evidence render(s) justified and so rational to believe. Judgments of instrumental efficacy-or, if we continue to conflate causal and epistemic relations, instrumental rationality-are dependent upon judgments concerning that epistemic relation.
Consequently, instrumental rationality must be seen not as the whole of rationality, but rather as itself dependent upon non-instrumental, 'categorical' conceptions both of rationality and of the relation obtaining between good reasons/evidence and the beliefs, judgments, and claims for which they are (it is) good reasons/ evidence. Instrumental rationality can be regarded as a dimension or form of rationality only to the extent that it is underwritten by non-instrumental rationality.
3. Replies to Giere and Laudan. It is instructive to consider Giere's and Laudan's responses to my earlier critiques in light of the argument just made.
Giere, under the sub-heading "Can Instrumental Rationality Be Enough?", argues that:
One way to challenge a naturalistic approach is to argue that a rationality of means is not enough. There must be a rationality of goals as well because, it is claimed, there is no such thing as rational action in pursuit of an irrational goal. (Siegel 1985) This sort of argument gains its plausibility mainly from the way philosophers use the vocabulary of "rationality." If one simply drops this vocabulary, the point vanishes. Obviously, there can be effective action in pursuit of any goal whatsoever-as illustrated by the proverbial case of the efficient Nazi. The claimed connection between instrumental and categorical rationality simply does not exist. (Giere 1988, 10) Giere is of course correct that there can indeed be "effective action in pursuit of any goal whatsoever." Does this establish that "effective action in pursuit of any goal" exhausts the philosophical legitimacy of questions about the rationality of both means and goals? Hardly. Giere here equivocates. If by "the vocabulary of 'rationality' " he means simply philosophical use of the word 'rationality', then he is wrong that questions concerning the rationality of ends vanish. For they are readily replaced by other, more or less equivalent questions: e.g., "Should that goal have been pursued?", or "Are/were there any good reasons for pursuing it, or for not pursuing it?" Thus redefining 'rationality' in terms of effective action does not do away with substantive questions (which do not involve actioneffectiveness) concerning the evaluative status of candidate ends. On the other hand, if by "the vocabulary of 'rationality'" Giere means to include questions which are couched in terms of words like 'should', 'reasons', and the like, then it is clear that questions about the rational status of ends do vanish with the dropping of all this vocabulary. But why should we emasculate our language so? Does Giere really deny that we can coherently criticize as irrational or epistemically indefensible the goal of the efficient Nazi; does he deny that there are powerful reasons for rejecting the Nazi's goals (or that we can intelligibly evaluate, in terms of reasons, other candidate goals)? In short: if 'rationality' is simply redefined, as All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms all questions about 'rationality' so redefined can be treated in an i means-ends way; but many important philosophical questions abo are not captured by this redefinition. In this case, the baby goes th bathwater. On the other hand, if we resist Giere's redefinition, and ins to understand 'rationality' as involving the epistemic or normative fo then it will be immediately obvious that many legitimate questio rationality cannot be resolved in instrumental terms. Either way, Gi fails to resolve the issue concerning the rationality of ends in the w Even if we grant Giere's claim that 'rationality' applies only to me efficacy) and not to ends, moreover, the fundamental difficulty rem zation of M in pursuit of G will be rational only if the relevant evide the claim C that M is efficacious with respect to G; and, while the re M and G may be one of instrumental efficacy, the relation between The establishment of a claim concerning instrumental efficacy rem mic, and not an instrumental, matter. This difficulty is not addres response.
Laudan's response is more extreme: he denies that there is an instrumental/ epistemic distinction to be drawn, and asserts that epistemic rationality is itself just a special case of instrumental rationality:
There is no coherent sense of justification (epistemic or otherwise) ... in the absence of the specification of the ends with respect to which an action is deemed justified or rational. (1990b, 317) Siegel tells us that there are two, mutually exclusive forms of rationality and justification: instrumental and epistemic. But . .. epistemic justificationeven in Siegel's sense-is simply a species of the genus instrumental rationality. ... Epistemic rationality, no less than any other sort of rationality, is a matter of integrating ends and means. (1990b, 318) Good reasons are instrumental reasons; there is no other sort. (1990b, 320) It may be that Laudan is thinking only of rational action, and does not intend his claim to be applied also to beliefs or claims, as the first citation indicates; that might partly explain our divergent analyses.7 In any case, his response fails utterly to establish that there are no reasons but instrumental ones. As argued above, E's constituting good reason for "M is causally efficacious with respect to G" is not dependent upon or relative to any particular end. E's goodness as a reason for that claim is a matter entirely of the content(s) of E, the claim concerning causal efficacy, and the epistemic relations which exist between them. Laudan acknowledges that he relies on a notion of good reasons or suitable grounds (1990b, 315-316, 318 ), but he offers no clue as to how these locutions are to be understood in means/ends terms, or on what ends these epistemic notions are supposed to depend. Consider the example above, concerning single-versus double-blind methodology, which Laudan introduced in his (1984) . We have lots of empirical evidence that 6It is obvious, I hope, that Giere's comment in the cited passage regarding Siegel 1985 does not succeed, for it trades on the equivocation just discussed. When I suggested that effective action in pursuit of an unjustifiable goal is irrational, I of course did not mean that such action is ineffectiveex hypothesi it is. The point is rather that, however effective, there may nevertheless be powerful reasons which speak against the pursuit of that goal (as, e.g., in Giere's Nazi case). In that sensei.e., in the sense in which 'rationality' involves not pragmatic effectiveness but rather reflectiveness of the epistemic force of relevant reasons-there clearly can be effective but nevertheless irrational action.
71 am grateful to Ed Erwin for this suggestion, and for his good advice concerning the following paragraphs.
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This content downloaded from 129. 4. Conclusion. Naturalists are of course correct that the establishment of claims concerning instrumental efficacy/rationality requires appeal to (naturalistic, empirical) evidence. It remains, nevertheless, that a non-naturalistic, non-instrumental story about that evidence and the rational warrant it provides is needed in order to make sense of the alleged instrumental connection between candidate means and ends. For how will we tell whether or not some means M is indeed efficacious for the achievement of some goal G, such that we are instrumentally rational in utilizing M or in believing the result of its utilization? By gathering evidence, presumably, about the efficacy of M with respect to that achievement. When the evidence is gathered and evaluated, it will (ideally) yield conclusions like "Method M is efficacious for the achievement of our epistemic ends; method M* is not (or is less so). Therefore we should utilize method M." But that the evidence indeed warrants such conclusions is not something that can be understood in instrumental terms: to what further end could we appeal in arguing that our evidence does or does not support such conclusions? There is no such further end-and, moreover, it is a mistake to understand the question in this way, since, as just argued, it confuses causal and epistemic notions and relations. Rather, we have no choice but to refer to our best theory of evidence; to our best theoretical account of the epistemic or normative force that reasons and evidence might enjoy and transmit S122 to the claims which they support. This theory cannot be a naturalisti naturalism restricts itself to instrumental concerns, for instrumental co will not serve to justify such claims of instrumental efficacy. When t argues that "E shows or suggests that M is more efficacious than M* to G," she is appealing not to some further goal.8 She is appealing rat non-instrumental account of evidential warrant or probative force, su cording to that account) E warrants that claim. I do not for a mom that any particular account of such force enjoys wide acceptance amon porary epistemologists/philosophers of science. I am suggesting rat naturalist needs such an account every bit as much as the non-natural that such an account cannot be had naturalistically, if naturalism is r instrumental concerns. Hence naturalism is at most a seriously incom ophy of science-and a non-naturalistic, 'categorical' conception of prerequisite for its completion.
